Regeneration in the UK
An analysis of the evolution of regeneration policy
Introduction

The following pages explore the evolution of regeneration policy in the UK since 1945.
Regeneration practice in the UK has evolved extensively since the late 1980s. This review will employ a wide ranging definition of regeneration to avoid the academic 'hairsplitting' that has historically characterised attempts to describe that evolution. Historically, practice has ranged from simply defined economic strategies, through physical and urban space initiatives to more complex attempts to socially engineer change in cultural attitudes of the urban poor. The most recent experience in programmes such as New Deal for Communities has attempted to unify these multiple processes within a single programme. This has created a view of regeneration as a broad-based approach to the improvement of the quality of life in identified spatial locations. These have been referred to as 'neighbourhoods' in England and 'communities' in Scotland and Wales. This review will adopt that very broad definition in order to encompass the full range of practice which has informed the evolution of regeneration policy in the UK. This definition of regeneration has been effectively encapsulated in the definition offered by the Department for Communities and Local Government

'Regeneration is a set of activities that reverse economic, social and physical decline in areas where market forces will not do this without support from government' (Authors emphasis). (DCLG, 2008, p6)

The evolution of regeneration can be broadly divided into three periods:

- The pre-1968 period
- 1968 - 1997
- 1997-present

Of these it is the latter period which is of greatest interest to this review. However, some consideration of earlier periods is required to understand the antecedents of most recent practice and the influences that have determined the broad consensus that has emerged around the general value of area-based regeneration programmes which has characterised the post-1997 period. The following sections explore in detail the three identified periods.
This section examines the period leading up to 1968.
This period was effectively characterised by the overall Regional Selective Assistance programme which was instigated following the 1930s depression and attempted to redress some of the regional economic imbalances that emerged as a consequence of decline in key industries, including ship-building and coal-mining. This ensured that Wales was a beneficiary, notably with the establishment of the ‘trading estates’ at Treforest and Bridgend. These attempts to diversify the Welsh economy by promoting light manufacturing and engineering generally failed to replicate the levels of employment lost in the primary industries but have ensured that the economy of the coastal plain in Wales has avoided the worst of the decline experienced deeper in the South Wales Valleys. Perhaps the most notable support for the Welsh economy which came from this programme was the establishment of the Hoover factory at Merthyr Tydfil in 1948.

It was this general economic approach which continued until the mid-1970s and indeed remained the characteristic approach of the Welsh Development Agency and its emphasis on attracting large-scale employment largely through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The regenerative capacity of such programmes lay in their ability to provide employment in areas of high unemployment and were further associated with deliberate relocation of key UK government services to areas like Wales, resulting in for example the DVLA office at Swansea, Passport Offices at Newport and Companies House and Inland Revenue offices at Cardiff.

The long-established consensus on the value of Regional Assistance effectively disappeared with the formation of the Thatcher government in 1979 when budgets were substantially reduced and the concept of regional economic disparity became acceptable within an overall market-driven view of the economy. However, successive Conservative Secretaries of State for Wales were able to resist the monetarist orthodoxy of the UK government and retain considerable elements of 'regional assistance' through initiatives such as Programme for the Valleys which repackaged government funding into specific support programmes for employment in the Valleys region.

Current policy which effectively replicates the functions of Regional Assistance includes Economic Renewal: a new direction (WG, 2010) and the newly published Wales Infrastructure Investment Plan (WG, 2012). However, rather than direct assistance to specific companies which would have been the primary methodology in the past, the emphasis has shifted to establishing strongly favourable conditions for specific sectors of the economy to flourish by investing in skills and infrastructure.

**Conclusion 1:** A background of a strong and diversified economy is a pre-requisite for regeneration and provides
the employment which underpins a viable and sustainable society. Sectoral support mechanisms and infrastructural investment must provide the required economic environment for more localised regeneration programmes.
This chapter outlines the critical period of regeneration policy development that established many of the core ideas and approaches we identify as regeneration today.
The emergence of modern 'urban policy' is generally recognised to have occurred with a series of landmark reports published in the mid 1960s which identified a range of emerging social problems. The comfortable political consensus of the post-war period was thought to have engineered the good society and abolished the Five Great Wants identified in the Beveridge Report. The welfare state of post-war Britain was believed to provide a safety net 'from the cradle to the grave'. In reality clear social problems existed and were highlighted by popular cultural outputs such as Cathy Come Home (1966) and official enquiries such as the Seebohm Report (1968). Both identified the harsh social conditions experienced by poorer families in the UK and led to the creation of the modern social services. A climate emerged which identified the need for state intervention in critical public services and particularly in the inner city areas of the UK where poverty and emerging racial tensions were felt to pose some threat to the public order. The first conscious government intervention was in the Urban Aid Programme which identified inner city areas where specific additional support would be provided through local authorities. The aim was to 'compensate' for the negative social and economic conditions by improving services and increasing provision. Emphasising education, community and environment the programme increased funding for specific public services in inner city locations. For example higher salaries were paid to teachers in inner city schools in an attempt to attract the best teachers.

Conclusion 2: The Urban Aid programme effectively established a continuing consensus that regeneration requires specific budgets focused on deprived communities to alleviate market failure and a cycle of deprivation

The Urban Aid programme was followed by the Community Development Programme which established 12 localities where community development teams worked with residents to develop community support mechanisms to improve family and community life. One locality was the Llynfi Valley, near Maesteg. The programme foundered on intense disagreement between government and the appointed delivery teams whose assertion that poverty was structural in origin and not personal failure did not accord with the government ideology of the time. The failure of this programme effectively discredited community development approaches for a whole regeneration until the Labour government of 1997 rehabilitated the concept.

Conclusion 3: Regeneration policy must be clear and unambiguous in its aims and objectives to avoid dissonance between outcomes required by government and those developed by delivery agencies.

Following the collapse of the Community Development Programme an urban policy vacuum ensued until the 1977 White Paper: Policy for the Inner Cities which was informed by the in-
intervening Inner Area Studies research programme in major UK inner city areas. Set against the failing economy of the mid-1970s with stagflation and post oil-shock unemployment, the White Paper identified the structural causes of poverty and inner city market failure and related them to the environmental degradation of the inner city and the emergence of social problems. In many ways the White Paper previewed later debates in the 1980s around the 'new poverty' and its multi-dimensional character and notably was the first policy programme to identify the need to bend public expenditure to areas of critical need. Notably, the White Paper also advocated:

- Partnership working between public, private and third sectors
- Spatial targeting of interventions in the poorest localities
- Integrated approaches in health, housing, education and employment.
- 'Bending' of mainstream funding programmes in favour of the most disadvantaged locations.

Arising from the recommendations of the White Paper, the Inner Urban areas Act of 1978 was created. However, the Labour administration had little opportunity to implement its policies before defeat in the 1979 election.

With the election of the Thatcher Government in 1979, a significant change took place in the state’s approach to delivery of urban policy. This was a direct reflection of the market-based policies of the then Conservative Government. As Michael Heseltine argued in 1979:

> the Government is committed to take a radical look at the way in which bureaucratic institutions affect our industry and economic performance, we see the need to redefine the frontier between the public and private sector. (Hansard, 13.9.1979 in Imrie and Thomas, 1993, 7).

In retrospect, it is clear, that the wider economic restructuring policies of the Conservative Government were more important than any specific policy approach towards urban decline. A changing economic policy context favoured high interest fiscal policy to promote banking and financial services at the expense of manufacturing. Rising unemployment was regarded as a necessary price to pay for reducing inflation and overall the UK’s post-industrial regions were most adversely affected, including of course Wales which saw huge reductions of employment in mining and steel production.

Policy towards inner city and deprived urban areas was conditioned by the wider commitment to ‘market-led’ solutions but recognised that in areas of market failure some level of interven-
tion was required. This view promoted the identification of the private sector as a stakeholder in the delivery of urban policy as proposed in the Labour 1977 Urban White Paper. This strong market orientation was present in urban policy before its incorporation into other areas of public policy, such as health and social services. This economic/market dominated approach continued throughout the whole period of successive conservative governments from 1979 to 1997. Of particular significance was the Urban Development Corporations as a testing ground for the enterprise/market culture propounded by the Thatcher Government. These will be dealt with in full in the section on Special Purpose Vehicles.

This private sector emphasis prevailed throughout the years of Conservative administration reflecting a broader ideological attachment to 'market-based' solutions. In areas of market failure the approach was centred on trying to promote market activity through private sector engagement. A plethora of initiatives followed including:

- Enterprise zones. (EZ's)
- Estate Action
- City Grant
- Garden Festivals
- Housing Action Trusts
- Urban Aid continued programme

The Urban Aid Programme continued alongside these initiatives but with reduced budgets and greater emphasis on economic rather than social interventions. This increased emphasis on economic expenditure (under the Urban Programme and in the various initiatives indicated above) exemplified the Conservative Government's approach in the 1980's, where it was clear that wealth creation not welfare was the primary goal of urban policy (Parkinson and Evans, in Robinson, 1989,8). This approach was confirmed within the Government's own 1988 policy statement, "Action for Cities", which made no reference to social equity and welfare requirements. Rather its emphasis was on enterprise, self-help, business and environmental improvement. This ‘trickle-down’ theory assumed that any wealth created by a market-focus would find its way to the poorer sections of society through improved employment opportunities and higher wages. In reality, poverty increased exponentially rising from around 7% in 1969 to 29% in 1989. Commentators identified the 'new poverty' which was regionally and spatially defined by an acceleration of financial economic activity and a decline of manufacturing and industry. This emphasised a North South divide and a new geography of poverty was created in the UK.

Growing criticism of this crisis of poverty emerged from unexpected sources, including the Archbishop of Canterbury's Commission on Urban Priority Areas which in 1985 published the
Faith in the City Report which roundly condemned government policies for the crisis in ‘inner city’ Britain. By the end of the 1980s more formal criticism of the government’s policy effectiveness came from key public agencies. The Audit Commission in 1989 noted "Government support programmes are seen as a patchwork of complexity and idiosyncrasy", and the National Audit Office in 1990, referred to a "complex hotch/potch of urban initiatives" (in Atkinson & Moon, 1994, 96).

**Conclusion 4: Regeneration policy cannot be driven by ideological beliefs and political values but must be based on sound evidence of what works. Policies should be evidenced-based and continually informed by active review and evaluation.**

Against this background of criticism the wider economic failure of the period and the eventual departure of Margaret Thatcher, a substantial revision of urban policy emerged which, whilst maintaining a role for the private sector, also recognised that local authorities were an essential partner in the regeneration process. The City Challenge programme was launched in 1991 with the aim of transforming specific run down inner city areas and improving the quality of life of local residents. City Challenge ran in 31 deprived urban areas from 1992 to 1998, and represented a significant shift in regeneration policy. The programme introduced a number of new features, such as a comprehensive and partnership based approach, which addressed many of the limitations of previous urban policy initiatives. The City Challenge partnerships were invited to compete for a grant of £37.5 million over 5 years. The key characteristics of the City Challenge programme included:

- a fixed level of finance over a limited period
- a partnership-based approach
- no new financial resources were provided with funding based on the top slicing of previous DOE inner city and housing programmes
- competitive bidding was introduced as a means of allocating financial resources
- the involvement of the local community in the regeneration process was promoted
- facilitated a shift from locally determined capital programmes to central government control, and it continued the on-going shift from needs to opportunity / competition based resource allocation.

Numerous commentaries have concluded that City Challenge was a more effective intervention than previous urban policies and a number of its key features have become enshrined as core requirements of regeneration policy. In particular:
Conclusion 5: That comprehensive partnership, involving public, private and third sector organisations, is required for effective delivery.

and

Conclusion 6: That engagement with and involvement of local stakeholders and community organisations brings a dividend in maximising local impact.

The same period saw the establishment of English Partnerships. Intended as a ‘roving’ UDC, it promoted ‘hard side’ regeneration for example land-reclamation and development and the provision of strategic infrastructure. English Partnerships continued to operate until 2009 when it merged with the Housing Corporation to form the Homes and Communities Agency. The experience of English Partnerships may offer little to this review given its England only remit. However, it is worth noting that the government’s interim evaluation of 1999 was positive with regard to its innovative approaches to delivering regeneration with its application of a full menu of regeneration measures designed to assist the private sector, e.g. providing gap-funding, making loans and guarantees available to the private sector.

More important was the creation of the Single Regeneration Budget Programme in April 1994. It brought together existing funding streams but also established the Challenge Fund based on competitive bidding. It promoted a more regional approach in conjunction with the creation of the Government Offices of the Regions and the later Regional Development Agencies and shifted focus away from relatively localised areas of acute need. The integration of diverse budgets and the promotion of innovative projects was generally well received and the programme was delivered through six successive rounds each building on the experience of the previous round. By the end of the programme the final evaluation was generally positive and reinforces some of the conclusions drawn so far in this review. The evaluation stresses the value of:

- Effective delivery partnership
- Private Sector Engagement
- A visible role for the voluntary sector which improved as the programme progressed.
- The application of permeable boundaries.
- The flexibility of approach

However, there is a general recognition that the SRB programme did not achieve any major ‘programme bending’ by bringing mainstream budgets more efficiently to problem areas.
This is a general concern throughout the history of regeneration policy in the UK and will be returned to later in this review. The SRB programme points to a number of conclusions which would be wisely reflected in future Welsh regeneration policy including a clear confirmation of Conclusions 5 & 6 presented above. To this we would add:

**Conclusion 7: That the avoidance of tightly prescribed spatial boundaries can improve programme outcomes.**

The evaluation of SRB emphasised that if sustainable improvements in the well-being of a deprived area were to be achieved then the budgets of all the mainstream service providers would have to be focused on the specific needs of the area for a considerable period of time. There is a need for both more customised policy delivery for deprived areas and more funding for deprived areas relative to other areas. (DCLG 2007, p5)

The period 1968 -1997 saw the development of urban policy to a form that we would now very clearly recognise as regeneration. Although over-driven by a free-market approach the evolution of policy in this period paved the way for the Labour government’s ambitious programmes post-1997 and provided a considerable body of evidence which policy development was able to build on. The learning from this period in many ways supports the Labour White Paper of 1977 and provided a very sound ba-
This chapter reviews a period in which unprecedented attention was paid to the delivery of area based programmes in all regions of the UK. Basic approaches were shared but actual delivery patterns and structures vary considerably, influenced by the specific perspectives of devolved governments.
With the 1997 Labour election it was clear from manifesto commitments that tackling poverty would be a major component of the new government’s programme. Signalled immediately by the creation of the Social Exclusion Unit in the Cabinet office and the commissioning of a wide-ranging series of Policy Action Team Reports eradicating poverty and social exclusion was a cross-cutting government programme. Built on an analysis of social exclusion as a social pattern which emerged from long-term unemployment and concentrations of multiple disadvantage, the government saw integration into the labour-market as the key mechanism for social inclusion and poverty eradication. The New Deal programme was designed to target specific social groups with long-term employment difficulties by creating support and incentive mechanisms to re-join the labour market. However, the approach also recognises that there were locations in the UK where such high concentrations of poverty had accumulated that special measures were required to promote job-readiness in local populations who had been completely distanced from the labour-market for several generations. This was a spatially targeted regeneration programme set within a wide-ranging strategic framework.

At the same time the devolution process was assigning these responsibilities to newly elected regional governments in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Here whilst similar conclusions had been formed and a consensus around the use of Area Based Initiatives (ABI) had been established there developed a degree of policy deviation in the actual mechanisms of delivery and the specific approaches being taken. This diversity of policy now offers considerable opportunity to examine what works and what is less successful in regenerating disadvantaged communities. Each devolved policy platform will be examined and conclusions for the current review of regeneration in Wales will be drawn from that significant evidence base.

**Northern Ireland**

Any analysis of regeneration policy in Northern Ireland is overshadowed by several key factors including the peace process and associated primacy of achieving the peace dividend, the periodic suspension of devolution and the consequent reversion of responsibility to the Northern Ireland Office. This has generated a start/stop/start experience of the regeneration process for all stakeholders in Northern Ireland. The review of policy begins with the New Targeting Social Need (NewTSN) programme introduced in July 1998. This programme succeeded the original Targeting Social Need Programme established in 1991 and was equally concerned to reduce ‘community differentials’ as well as recognise the broad distribution of poverty in Northern Ireland (NIA, 2001).

The New TSN had the following key objectives:
reducing unemployment and improving employability,
addressing general inequalities in health, education and housing
tackling social exclusion

The latter objective was supported by an additional policy strand, the Promoting Social Inclusion programme within the New TSN. Administratively, New TSN was supported by a specific New TSN Central Unit in the Assembly and an Inter-Departmental Equalities and Social Need Steering Group was established which included representatives from the Northern Ireland office as well as the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Central Unit eventually became the Central Poverty Unit in the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM).

New TSN was not a separately funded policy stream but an attempt to co-ordinate actions across all departments of government with each required to produce an annual TSN Action plan which outlined how they would support the TSN objectives in the actions and programmes of the Department. Each plan was reviewed annually and judgements of achievements against the proposed actions were made. The intention was for the programme to influence the policies and spending patterns of all government departments within a general improvement of the impact of public services on poverty and social exclusion. In general terminology, the initiative was primarily a ‘programme bending’ approach in which a centrally determined set of objectives were intended to influence the work of all departments and improve impact on key problems underpinning poverty in Northern Ireland. The 2004 Annual Report also added the concept of ‘mainstreaming’ to describe the process of integrating New TSN ‘into the policy and programme development of all departments.’ (NIA, 2004, p1).

The 2003 Evaluation of the New TSN identified a number of problems with the approach. Most importantly, it found little evidence of additionality, in that few government departments could point to major actions which ‘would not have happened anyway’ (OFMDFM, 2003, p101). New TSN also appeared at the time of the evaluation to operate within Departmental boundaries with little evidence of joint approaches to tackling the housing, education and health inequalities. These tended to be focused on by the lead departments but with little crossover into other statutory areas which could support improved equality in these key policy domains. However, individual reports for some Departments pointed to some evidence of skewing of efforts and resources towards the New TSN objectives, although this was in part limited by the relevance of the New TSN programme to the remit of the specific Department.
Many of these limitations were confirmed in the 2004 Review of the New TSN (OFMDFM, 2004) which has prompted the late 2006 launch of the Life Time Opportunities policy platform (OFMDFM, 2007). The policy adopts the UK government targets for halving child poverty by 2010 and its eradication by 2020. The policy identified 8 key areas for actions within a new anti-poverty strategy. With a strong emphasis on a life-stages model of poverty the programme proposed targeting early years intervention with the under 4 year old population, a children and young persons programme for 5-16 year olds, actions for working age adults and for citizens beyond working age. As in the case of New TSN it was a cross departmental initiative which targets:

- Eliminating poverty
- Eliminating social exclusion
- Tackling area based deprivation
- Eliminating poverty from rural areas
- Shared future shared challenges to reduce sectarian divisions.
- Tackling inequality in the labour market
- Tackling Health Inequalities
- Tackling cycles of deprivation

(OFMDFM, 2006)

Additionally, there was a focus on tackling area based deprivation and the link to and reinforcement of the People and Place Strategy which was launched in 2003 (DSDNI). Offering a 7-10 year programme of urban regeneration, the Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy outlined a multi-stranded approach to regeneration in the 36 most deprived urban areas. The areas were termed Urban Renewal Areas and were selected using the Noble Index of deprivation and represent the top 10% of deprived neighbourhoods. The policy promoted community, economic, social and physical renewal. Central to the approach is the improvement of public services in the target communities. In government the programme was managed by the Cross-Departmental Group under the leadership of the Minster for Social Development, with representatives from all the other Assembly departments. Key features of the policy include a central role for Neighbourhood Partnerships, supported by a development team where necessary. The Partnership played a lead role in analysing community needs, developing a Vision Statement and formulating Action Plans which take the community forward.

There was also a separate Rural Anti-Poverty and Social Inclusion Framework by the Department of Rural Development. Delivered through a Rural Development Programme the policy promotes business and job growth, and develops projects that ‘will enhance the quality of life in local communities and support strong community infrastructures. (DARD 2009, p3). Policy strands include fuel poverty, access to transport and childcare.
provision and an anti poverty and social inclusion challenge programme. This programme represents an attempt to tackle the specific features of rural poverty in Northern Ireland and is based on especially commissioned research papers by the Rural Community Network (RCN 2008) and the Rural Development Council (RDC 2008). The policy also proposes a specific programme of community development which recognises the special characteristics of communities and poverty in the rural context.

Implications for Wales
The policies identified above are the core regeneration policies evident in Northern Ireland in the last fifteen years. In addition to these there are a wide range of policies in health, education and housing which may have had impact on poverty. The three Phases of the Peace Programme have also spent considerable sums of money in some of the most deprived areas of Northern Ireland.

In general there are a number of implications for future regeneration policy in Wales and a number of conclusions for the Review of Regeneration Policy can be drawn.

Conclusion 8: The attempts to develop a cross-cutting, inter-departmental delivery of New TSN has much to commend it as a strategy to break down policy silos. Regretta-

bly, there is a clear conclusion that it has failed in practice and that Departmental programmes have simply assigned already active programmes to the New TSN framework. Little additionality has been achieved and programme bending and mainstreaming has largely failed.

Conclusion 9: Fragmentation of delivery can be significantly damaging to the regeneration agenda. Fragmentation can occur from:

- rapidly changing policy and programmes
- by disrupted bureaucratic and administrative structures
- by developing complex and multi-stranded policies which do not connect
- by maintaining professional divisions and failing to develop cross-sectoral skills (Egan)

Scotland
Analysis of regeneration policy in Scotland commences with the document Social Justice: a Scotland where everyone matters (Scottish Executive 1999). The document identified a set of targets for achievement by 2020 with strategic milestones which would be achieved in the interim years. The document adopted
a life stages approach to poverty policy which made a clear distinction between ‘people and places’ It identified key targets associated with children, young people, families, older people and communities. The ‘every community matters’(p16) component of the strategy set out objectives to close the unemployment gap, tackle substance misuse, reduce crime, improve housing quality, encourage voluntarism and improve internet access.

Since publication of that document regeneration policy in Scotland has undergone considerable evolution with quite major departures from this starting point. Whilst retaining many of the objectives of Social Justice, the mechanisms for their achievement have changed considerably. The Social Justice agenda was initially delivered through the establishment of the Social Inclusion Partnerships (SIPS). The Social Inclusion Partnership Fund was established in 1998 and implementation of the programme established 48 area-based SIPS with a further 14 ‘thematic’ partnerships, for example, the Edinburgh Youth Social Inclusion Partnership which addressed issues for young people throughout Edinburgh.

Social Inclusion Partnerships were centrally concerned with community engagement both in the area and thematic partnerships (MacPherson et al 2007). Empowerment was a core theme alongside community involvement.

SIPS…. Sought to achieve a more holistic approach; a focus on partnership working and an emphasis on community involvement (Communities Scotland 2004, p2)

Social Inclusion Partnerships were supported by Communities Scotland which was established in 2001 as a Scottish Executive Agency with the key responsibility for housing, homelessness, communities and regeneration. A central role in its support for regeneration was performed by the Scottish Centre for Regeneration which has since been absorbed into the Scottish Executive following the abolition of Communities Scotland in 2008. The role of the Centre was to promote good practice in regeneration, develop learning networks and act as a ‘national hub’ on regeneration issues. The outputs from the Centre are well-respected throughout the UK and have done much to reinforce the belief that Scotland leads the devolved administrations on regeneration issues.

The document, Better Communities in Scotland. Closing the Gap was published in 2002 (Scottish Executive, 2002a) and signalled the transfer of SIPS into the community planning framework and their integration in 2004 with the Community Planning Partnerships. This also signalled a move away from local project delivery, which it was felt was too specific and localised in its effect, to more strategic interventions which sought to link across disadvantaged areas and connect them to more affluent
areas. This document was followed in 2003 with guidance on the integration of the SIPS with Community Planning Partnerships (Communities Scotland 2003).

The stated intention was to provide a greater community voice in the community planning process and ‘allow decision making on regeneration to be taken at the neighbourhood level within a national framework’ (p3). Each CPP was required to develop a Regeneration Outcome Agreement which linked ‘national and local priorities’. In 2004 the SIPS funding was combined with the Better Neighbourhood Services Fund into the (£318 million) Community Regeneration Fund. The fund supported actions which improved employability, education, health, access to local services and quality of the local environment and linked regeneration to the targets in the Closing the Opportunity Gap (Scottish Executive 2002b) which was the budget statement outlining how the Closing the Gap (Scottish Executive 2002a) priorities would be met.

The Community Regeneration Fund has since been replaced by the Fairer Scotland (FSF) which amalgamated it with a further six funding streams to provide an integrated funding source for community regeneration. Following the creation of a concordat between the Scottish Executive and the local authorities, funding is now provided to local authorities through the vehicle of a Single Outcome Agreement agreed between the Community Planning Partnerships and the Scottish executive. The Fairer Scotland Fund merged with the general funding settlement for each local authority in 2010 with the general funding profile agreed in a Single Outcome Agreement which has to demonstrate support for the 15 National Outcomes established by the Scottish executive. These are:

- Business
- Employment Opportunities
- Research and Innovation
- Young people
- Children
- Healthier lives
- Inequalities
- Crime
- Sustainable places
- Communities
- Environment
- National identity
- Environmental impact

Two concerns have emerged amongst practitioners following these changes. Firstly, the new emphasis on the poverty of people rather than place may fail to address the high concentrations of spatially patterned poverty evident in Scotland. Secondly, there are major concerns about the competence of local
authorities in the anti-poverty agenda and whether they will retain sufficient focus on anti-poverty issues within a non-hypothecated budget allocation.

**Implications for Wales**
This programme of policy evolution in Scotland can offer some clear implications for future regeneration policy in Wales. Many of the social conditions in Scotland are similar to the issues confronting the regeneration agenda in Wales. There are clear spatial concentrations of poverty characterised by long-term unemployment and economic inactivity where populations experience poor health and educational outcomes. Social Housing quality has seen significant improvement but remains the primary location of people experiencing poverty. Small towns experience similar patterns of decline to those in Wales and the issue of rural poverty is as central to Scotland as it is in Wales.

**Conclusion 10:** the early emphasis in Scotland on both 'people' and 'place' based initiatives acting in combination is worthwhile noting and emulating in future policy in Wales. Ensuring physical, urban and housing-led regeneration fully meshes with the wider Welsh Government anti-poverty programme is essential.

**Conclusion 11.** The common location of the housing and regeneration policy responsibility within, initially Communities Scotland, has ensured strong outcomes for improvement of housing quality in some of the most deprived housing communities.

**Conclusion 12.** A long-standing history of effective partnerships has ensured that the transition through different policy developments has ensured continuity of delivery and the bringing forward of learning from past programmes. However, this is felt to be put at risk by locating regeneration budgets within the Local Authority funding regime without the protection of hypothecation. It is not clear that all local authorities have the skills to deliver effective regeneration.

There is a general opinion in Scotland that national level monitoring and evaluation of policy and delivery has been weak with failure to establish well-measured baseline information. There has been a consequent emphasis on more qualitative results which measure 'softer' outcomes. This has been amplified in recent years by rapid changes of policy before success and failure factors have become clear. This can also be said of Wales and future regeneration policy must attend to his deficit.
Conclusion 13. A clear monitoring and evaluation policy should be established as a critical element of the design of regeneration programmes. It should include on-going monitoring which informs fine-tuning of programmes during their delivery as well as end of programmes evaluations which are vital to inform future policy design and delivery.

Where local evaluations have occurred in Scotland there is a general view that, as in other policy examples, there has been a general failure of the twin and related objectives of 'programme bending' and mainstreaming. This was the case in Northern Ireland and is also true of Scotland. This will be specifically examined later in this review.

England
The examination of area-based regeneration policy in England is comparatively straightforward given a degree of stability in the key policy programmes. However, a certain degree of complexity is produced by the multiplicity of funding streams which have supported the regeneration process. The 1997 Labour administration made an early commitment to area-based regeneration (Hoban and Beresford 2001) and the starting point for any account of regeneration policy in England has to be the New Deal for Communities (NDC).

Introduced in 1998 with a projected budget of £2 billion over 10 years the programme started with 17 Pathfinder projects. It was expanded with a further 22 schemes the following year. The New Deal for Communities Partnerships were required to focus on five areas of intervention:

- Housing and environment
- Health
- Education
- Fear and experience of crime
- Reducing worklessness

An approach based in community involvement was required and the pattern of delivery of the programme could be seen as an attempt to partly sidestep local government, which was perceived as by New Labour as one of the factors contributing to social exclusion through poor service delivery. Although the relevant local authority was the Accountable Body in almost all cases, the delivery body was an independent organisation, usually constituted as a Development Trust.

Whilst the first New Deal for Communities Partnerships were being established, the Social Exclusion Unit, newly created in the Cabinet Office by Tony Blair, was identifying the need for a National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (SEU 1998). Emerging from consultation in 2001 as the National Strategy Action
Plan ((SEU 2001)). the Strategy set out a vision that ‘within 10-20 years, no-one should be seriously disadvantaged by where they live (p7). NDC was a key element of the strategy and the five key areas of intervention identified in NDC were rolled into the Strategy.

The policy identified the ‘88 most deprived local authority districts’ for support and targeted them with an £800 million Community Renewal Fund supported by an additional £45 million for a Neighbourhood Management programme. Additional support to communities was provided through the Community Empowerment Fund (£35 million) and in a minor grant making programme controlled at the local level, the Community Chest fund (£50 million). This comprehensive policy platform and the associated level of funding signalled an unprecedented faith in the role of communities in the regeneration process as well as the government’s confidence in area-based regeneration. This was in addition to the already clear signals within the New Deal for Communities programme. Additional policy strands also supported the overall structure, including the Neighbourhood War- den fund, Skills and Knowledge Fund and Involving Business fund.

The Strategy was also to be underpinned by robust management and support mechanisms. Oversight was by the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minster, which reported to a Cabinet committee. This again demonstrated the centrality of this policy to the government’s wider programme. Additionally, Neighbourhood Renewal teams were placed in the regional government offices. The primary delivery mechanism was the Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) operating at local authority level to identify need in neighbourhoods and to prioritise actions. LSPs brought together key local authority departments, health authorities and police authorities together with local communities and the voluntary sector. The policy also introduced the concept of ‘floor targets’, a standard below which no community should be allowed to fall. This attempted to focus spending and priorities within government departments on addressing their poor levels of performance in the most disadvantaged communities.

The Neighbourhood Management Pathfinder programme was also a key element of the Neighbourhood Renewal agenda. The programme commenced in 2001 with 20 Pathfinders with a further 15 added to the programme in 2004. Each Pathfinder is managed by a Neighbourhood Manager with a support team. The delivery vehicle is a multi-agency partnership with local residents represented at partnership level. The partnerships develop a Local Area Agreement which shapes service delivery in the designated Pathfinder area. Essentially, the Programme is a neighbourhood approach to service improvement and places a
high value on community engagement as a means to influence service providers.

This overall policy structure remained relatively stable throughout the period until the demise of the Labour Government although funding for these programmes ended in 2007 before the election and were replaced by the Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF) which also incorporates the Department of Work and Pension’s Deprived Areas Fund (CLG, DWP 2007). The fund was intended to galvanise ‘community actions on worklessness’ and to target ‘areas of high worklessness by devolving and empowering communities’ (p5).

As in Scotland this shift recognised a greater role for Local Authorities who were the recipients of the new Area Based Grant (ABG) in which the general characteristic was non ‘ring-fenced’ funding.

Implications for Wales

Unlike other devolved administrations there is almost an excess of formal evaluations of principle regeneration policies in England. Monitoring and evaluation of New Deal for Communities has been extensive at the local level and effectively collated to provide a national picture. The 2005 Interim Evaluation (ODPM 2005) painted a generally positive picture of change in several key domains of the programme including community engagement, engaging with agencies and environment, with notable progress on crime and fear of crime. However, there was only minor or no change in relation to health, education and employment. This was confirmed in the Final Programme Evaluation.

A significant body of learning is available from this English experience which has been sustained for over ten years and has been well-funded and centrally supported in Government. The ability to fully review the programme and effectively assess its impact, both locally and nationally, is a huge advantage and fully reinforces Conclusion 13 about the need for robust monitoring and evaluation.

Perhaps of equal importance in England was the ‘whole government’ commitment to social inclusion and the central drive provided to regeneration by its location in the Office of the Deputy Prime minister (ODPM). Reporting routes through a Cabinet Committee also ensured inter- and cross departmental support.

Conclusion 14. To be effective, regeneration policy must be a key ministerial responsibility and enjoy whole government support alongside clear reporting structures to the office of the First Minister and Cabinet

The extent of expenditure on the overall Strategy For Neighbourhood Renewal and all its associated spending streams has
not been replicated in other administrations and it is unlikely such sustained high levels of expenditure will be repeated even after the resolution of the current financial crisis. However, the levels of funding were sufficient to instigate both physical and social change and significantly alter the character of 'place' and the experience of 'people'. This combination is essential for the achievement of effective regeneration. Whilst every effort must be made to maximise the impact of even limited expenditure it is the case that regeneration cannot be achieved without major expenditure. Funding can be drawn from all partners in the regeneration process but will always be heavily dependent on state and private sector expenditure.

Conclusion 15. Whilst every effort must be made to maximise the impact of any expenditure, the Welsh Government should take every opportunity to increase budgets available for regeneration. It can achieve this by exploring and developing innovative approaches to funding, partnership and social procurement.

Conclusion 16. To assist in realising maximum regeneration funding levels Welsh Government should recognise the regeneration potential of all its revenue and capital expenditure to fully develop supply chain and employment opportunities throughout all departments. Adoption of the housing related Can Do Toolkit developed by i2i can assist in this objective.

In the New Deal for Communities Partnership it was recognised that multi-agency working was a requirement for successful delivery. By creating a specialist delivery body it was able to bring multiple public sector partners into close liaison with community members. The availability of significant budgets was persuasive and ensured meaningful dialogue and an ability to instigate actions. It is likely that these factors contributed to the higher levels of programme bending and mainstreaming which occurred in England.

Conclusion 17. Creation of a specialist delivery body can facilitate partnership, broker relationships and release energy for innovation and action. Distance from government and local government can facilitate decision making and delivery.
Throughout the periods examined there has been a range of organizational and governance arrangements to facilitate the regeneration of target areas. We discuss the key approaches in the following section.
Conclusion 17 points to the value of developing specific regeneration vehicles to deliver programmes at the local level. Whilst setting of overall objectives should be at national level, the specific means of achieving them are usually best determined in the context of local partnerships. The experience of City Challenge, SRB, and New Deal for Communities all point to the value of independence at the local level. Throughout the history of UK regeneration described here a variety of special purpose vehicles have emerged to deliver government objectives. Several of these will be considered in this section.

The Urban Development Corporations
The Urban Development Corporations (UDC's) were set up under the Local Government Planning and Land Act 1980, to regenerate designated areas of industrial and economic decline (NAO, 1993,6). The remit of the Urban Development Corporations was to secure the regeneration of their designated areas via primarily an economic and physical approach. They did this by bringing land and buildings back into effective use, encouraging the development of existing and new industry and commerce, creating an attractive environment, and ensuring that housing and social facilities were available to encourage people to live and work in the area (DETR, 1998, 2). The particular feature of the operation of the UDC's, was their commitment and single mindedness to the regeneration of spatially discrete areas which required the removal of local democracy. Hence the approach taken was, "central government imposing a deregulatory statutory on local areas through financial and legal means and via strategic political appointments to decision-making bodies" (Newman and Thornley, 1996, 125). The UDC's emphasis was on economic and environmental improvement with a very minor emphasis on social/community initiatives. In this respect financial expenditure on these initiatives was low. For example, with regard to the second and third generation Urban Development Corporations, expenditure on social community and training schemes ranged from just 0.1 % to 2.3% of an individual Corporation's expenditure (NAO, 1993, 2). Rather, the UDC's relied on the now discredited concept of "trickle-down" with the assumption that economic and physical/environmental improvement would over the long term, facilitate social and community regeneration. The UDCs' hard output/bottom line accountancy dominated approach was reflected in the output indicators, which relied on such measures as jobs created, length of roads built or improved, hectares of land reclaimed, amount of new commercial floor space built, private sector investment levered, the quantity of new housing units produced (DETR, 1998, 1).

Criticism by academic commentators of the UDC's approach and performance has been almost universal, but focuses on
their promotion of "flagship projects", and the pursuit of property-led regeneration (Lawless, Imrie and Thomas and Thornley in Bailey, 1995,52). Taking the Cardiff Bay Development Corporation as an example, a flavour of the concerns expressed can be understood via commentary by Thomas (1989, 37), when with regard to the evaluation of the project, he questions the opportunity cost of public investment and the displacement of problems from one area to another created by the spatial targeting of the regeneration initiative. These points reflect a general criticism that could be made of all of the UDC's, but equally they represent a microcosm of a much wider problem associated with urban regeneration initiatives.

Commentators have been particularly strident in their criticism of UDC's on this issue, noting that, "islands of renewal in seas of decay" have been created (Shaw and Robinson, 1998, 55). Wilkinson (in Shaw and Robinson 1998, 55) expounds this issue further in relation to regeneration developments in Newcastle undertaken in the 1980's, where he describes, " .... Isolated growth nodes within larger areas of decay, often dislocated in spatial and temporal terms from the localities which surround them..... it is an approach concerned with super imposing fragments on the city rather than with the comprehensive planning of urban areas". The emphasis on "place marketing" (Stewart, 1996, 23) via the production of glossy promotional brochures, rather than undertaking a comprehensive, strategic and planned approach to regeneration initiatives was a particular feature of the UDCs' and reflects in Solesbury's words (1987,21), "the general shift, from planning to opportunism as an appropriate management style for attacking urban problems", which took place in the 1980's.

Particular criticisms have been levelled at Cardiff Bay Development Corporation (Hambleton & Thomas, 1995, 130 and 135) and other UDC's, with regard to their lack of democratic accountability. The membership of the Boards of the UDC's were dominated by the business sector and local authorities, and local communities usually had little influence over their decisions. Furthermore, as central government appointed the Boards, there was a centralised control over the process of economic structuring which the UDC's were expected to undertake. This is significant, because any perceived lack of democratic endorsement of regeneration initiatives can hamper it's effectiveness. Urban Development Corporations consumed public sector expenditure at the expense of traditional Urban Programme expenditure. A general criticism that was warranted, and particularly so with regard to the London Docklands Development Corporation. This funding approach directly reflected the Conservative Government's approach to economic and social restructuring, and its electoral bias to the south east of England,
which serves to emphasise again the politically driven nature of urban regeneration initiatives.

Conclusion 18
Special delivery vehicles similar to UDCs have a potential role to play by providing independence of action and promoting public and private sector partnerships. However, they should be based on clear democratic principles and link either to existing democratic structures or provide alternative routes to community engagement similar to those developed in City Challenge, SRB and exemplified in NDC.

Urban Regeneration Companies.
The creation of URC’s as special purpose regeneration vehicles was first mooted in 1999 via the Lord Rogers/DETR Report, ‘Towards an Urban Renaissance’ (1999, p 147). The Labour Government’s White Paper of 2000( ps 62 and 63) endorsed the Report’s suggestions and drew attention to the creation of three URC’s, Liverpool Vision (the country’s first Urban Regeneration Company), New East Manchester and Sheffield One.

URC’s were a Labour Government response to the perceived criticisms of Urban Development Corporations (UDC’s). This centred on criticisms concerning the UDC’s lack of democratic accountability and suggested abuse of their discrete planning and compensation powers. There were also concerns about the marginalisation of local authorities in the regeneration process. (Imrie and Thomas,1993).

Hence, in 1997 the new Labour Government moved quickly to develop a new delivery vehicle which answered these complaints and criticisms but at the same time provided the sort of special purpose delivery agencies which are needed to undertake regeneration with a degree of autonomy and at speed.

Ironically, the last Labour Government in its latter years created new UDC’s, in part in response to a growing awareness that URCs lacked the autonomy and financial independence to undertake regeneration projects where particularly large scale needs and opportunities exist (e.g. see the creation of a URC for Thurrock Thames Gateway with the grant of planning powers, Regeneration and Renewal 30.9. 2005).

The role and character of URCs has principally been as follows:

- They are Independent companies, limited by guarantee. Their members have comprised local authorities, RDA’s (now abolished from 2011/12) and English Partnerships (now the HCA). When the URC was set up in Newport in Wales in 2002/03 the three principal partners were Welsh Government, the Welsh Development Agency and New-
port City Council. The partnership now comprises WG and NCC, following the demise of the WDA in 2006).

They fulfil a coordinating role to deliver economic regeneration but do not have statutory powers or hold assets.

Their primary role is to address significant development opportunities by developing and managing implementation of a master plan. They also build business confidence and realise a collective vision for the future of the area.

Jones and Evans (2008, 18) provide a succinct commentary on the role of the URCs as follows:

‘The idea is that the URC should set out a masterplan for the regeneration of a specific area. Public sector partners can then use this to prioritise the redevelopment of key infrastructure. This, in turn, can attract private capital to realise the rest of the plan. URCs themselves do not have significant resources simply acting to bring the other agents together with a clear focus on physical redevelopment rather than community renewal’.

The key features of URC’s are:

- Formal partnerships.
- An aspiration to be independent and operate at arms length.
- Strong planning lead regeneration.
- Rely on the funding and powers of its parent organisations and hence can suffer from a lack of organisational autonomy.

The primary focus of the URC’s has been on realising physical development opportunities in order to attract investment in to the designated areas and have not generally addressed social and economic factors. Consequently it has represented a less than holistic approach to regeneration.

It is also important to note that URCs unlike UDC’s have not possessed planning and land compensation powers. However, it is inevitable that any regeneration initiative will have to facilitate a spatial re-arrangement of land uses, and therefore possessing these powers or having access to these powers via their member partners is vital.
Implications for Wales

Wales has only one example of an URC in Newport Unlimited established originally as a partnership between Welsh Government, Newport City Council and The Welsh Development Agency. Established in 2003 in the face of major job losses at Llanwern and Ebbw Vale, the URC has been charged with redevelopment of the city centre and the promotion of regeneration sites at Llanwern and in the West Newport area.

An independent interim evaluation of Newport Unlimited by the consultants AECOM concluded in 2010 that Newport unlimited had performed relatively well compared to English Urban Regeneration Companies (URCs). After considering the volume of pre-development work such as site preparation and remediation, the scale of Newport’s outputs is relatively high. Broadly speaking the top performing URCs fall into two broad groups; the high achievers - Liverpool Vision, New East Manchester and Clyde Waterfront. These URCs have had considerably higher funding than the rest and have been in business longer although some have now completed their operations and have been wound up. Many have delivered significant volumes of new floor space and have demonstrated a mixed performance against the required output criteria. Taking the output targets as a whole Newport comes in 6th out of the top 15 URCs, despite being a younger initiative and having received significantly less funding than the other top URCs.

One highly significant result of AECOM’s report was that a decision was taken to concentrate the investment work of the URC in to six key City centre Districts or ‘i.e. Newport Gateway, Market Quarter, Retail Quarter, Clarence Place, Riverside Quarter and an Arts and Creative Quarter.

Hence, it could be argued that a best practice approach to regeneration has been adopted by targeting limited financial resources at discrete spatial locations within a coherent themed approach. The URC has identified individual regeneration projects and initiative some of which have already been completed including the Newport University campus building, the Central Railway Station, the Market Hall. Although the largest of the flag-ship regeneration projects, the Friars Walk retail scheme has yet to be delivered. However, against the background of the wider financial crisis and the critical challenge of attracting private sector investment the projects delivered to date represent considerable achievements.

Conclusion 19

The use of arms length development vehicles such as UDC’s and URC’s can have benefit for the regeneration process by distancing decision making from government and promoting less risk aversion, faster development times and easier relationships with private sector inves-
tors. However, any vehicles developed for these purposes must attend to appropriate levels of democratic accountability and representation of the full range of stakeholders in the regeneration process.

Business Improvement Districts

A Business Improvement District (BID) is a business-led and business funded body formed to improve a defined commercial area. A BID is basically a partnership arrangement between local authorities and the local business community in order to implement area-specific schemes, which will benefit the local business community, with the agreement of business ratepayers. Ratepayers will agree to pay an additional levy on their rate bill to finance a BID. The ratepayers themselves will be able to decide in advance on the way in which their money is spent and how much they are prepared to pay in addition to their rates bill. All ratepayers who are asked to contribute to a BID are eligible to vote on whether a BID is taken forward. BIDs are only taken forward if there above a 50% approval rating from local ratepayers and this has to include a majority in terms of their aggregate rateable value.

BIDs are not limited to any particular spatial level. A BID can be established in any place where additional services to those which the Local Authority provides, are desired by the local business community. Although traditionally BIDs are found in cities, towns or districts BIDs can be as small as one to two streets or significantly larger. The BID is a concept borrowed from America, where it has enjoyed prolonged periods of success in benefitting local areas, residents and businesses. However, BIDs are a relatively new proposition in Wales with powers to set up Business Improvement Districts being granted to Wales in the Local Government Act 2003. Whilst there has been a large take up of the BID model throughout the U.K, there remains only one BID in Wales, The Swansea BID.

Swansea BID is the only BID in Wales. The BID allows 800+ businesses in the City Centre to identify key issues that impact on their trading and start projects to tackle them. The BID is delivered through Swansea Business Improvements District Ltd, which is a not-for-profit organisation, limited by guarantee. It has a board of directors elected from the BID area, who pay the BID levy themselves. Swansea BID was voted in by business in the City Centre of Swansea in 2006 to develop and deliver improvements on the following core objectives - Transport and Access, Supporting and Attracting business, Raising the Profile, Brightening the City Centre, and Safe and Secure. Between 2006 and 2011, the Swansea BID has delivered the following (http://www.swanseacitycentre.com/index.cfm?articleid=6968, March 2011)
- Reduced violent crime & disorder by 68%
- Reduced retail crime by 12%
- Won a national City Centre cleansing award making Swansea City Centre cleanest City Centre in the Country.
- Brought in over 150,000 people into the City Centre through events such as Swansea Live, Get Welsh etc.
- Instrumental in making Swansea the safest University City in the Country = Increasing student recruitment = Increasing business for our members
- Brought in over 100,000 vehicles into the City Centre through car parking initiatives.
- Brought in an extra 3m pounds into City Centre businesses based on an average retail spend of £12 per person.
- Reduced member's costs by over £5,000 per year/£25,000 over BID term if all BID Member Benefits are taken.

The Swansea BID recently achieved a successful renewal ballot with a 63% majority of City Centre businesses voting YES to keep the BID for a further 5 years until 2016. With the apparent success in terms of results and popular opinion of the Swansea Bid, and other BID’s around the U.K, it would be desirable to promote BIDS considerably further in Wales.

**Conclusion 20**

The international evidence as well as local experience in Swansea points to the value of promoting BIDS in Wales and this should form a clear element of any revised regeneration programme.

**Enterprise Zones**

Enterprise Zones are designated areas where specific incentives are offered to attract new businesses and industry to a specific location. The Welsh Government are offering an impressive incentives package to encourage business to Welsh Enterprise Zones including; access to finance, diverse support packages, International trade advice, help with finding a location, workforce and skills development plus links with industry networks. The introduction of Enterprise Zones in Wales, in April 2012, was designed to strengthen the competitiveness of the Welsh economy, and demonstrate Welsh Government’s continued commitment to creating jobs and sustainable growth. However, it could be argued that their introduction in Wales was a direct response to their introduction in England, one year previous, amid fears that those in England may attract business and enterprise away from Wales. The Welsh government have been keen to stress that they are using Enterprise Zones model to construct a tailor-made Welsh solution to attracting new business to Wales, and not simply replicating the English approach.
The Welsh Government has opted to take a bespoke approach in each location; with each zone focused on a key target sector. According to the Welsh Government, sectors are a crucial part of Economic Renewal, the new direction that sets the role devolved government can play in providing the best conditions and framework to enable your company to grow and flourish. There are seven confirmed locations:

- Cardiff - focusing on Financial and Professional Services sector
- Anglesey - focusing on the energy sector
- Deeside - focusing on the advanced manufacturing sector
- St Athan - Cardiff Airport Enterprise Zone - focusing on the aerospace sector
- Ebbw Vale - focusing on the advanced manufacturing sector
- Snowdonia - focusing on the Energy and Environment and ICT sectors
- Haven Waterway - focusing on the Energy and Environment sector

Regional policies of this type, in their previous guise as Development Areas, have been periodically prominent in British policy making since 1945. Similar incentives were introduced to promote the spread of business throughout the country and away from the already flourishing South-East England. Although theoretically sound ideas, these incentives were rarely great enough to overcome the comparative advantages of locating near the core, as they failed to address the underlying issues of economic of scale and economies of agglomeration. Consequently, Development Areas often failed to promote the spread of industry and resulted in significant wastes of taxpayers’ money. Indeed, Wales’ has had to bear the embarrassment of some high profile failures, such as the LG factory in the 1990s. However, there is renewed optimism this time around. The scattergun approach of the 1980s is gone, and has been replaced by The Welsh Government’s approach of targeted Zones focussing on an area’s natural comparative advantage and established industry. Significant forethought and planning has gone into determining the location and focus of each zone in an attempt to improve on our past efforts. Although it is too early to judge the overall effectiveness of these policies this time around, the Welsh Enterprise Zones have received strong cross-party political support and strong support in the media and public opinion. There have also been some early success and job creation in Deeside and St Athan. If nothing else, the Welsh Enterprise Zones are currently necessary to prevent new industry being attracted solely to the English Enterprise Zones, at the expense of the Welsh economy.
Conclusion 21
The current Welsh Enterprise Zones support in general the objectives of regeneration and all opportunities should be taken to engage the regeneration policy with the opportunities that may be represented by Enterprise Zones. However, this should be subject to review to ensure that Enterprise Zones do live-up to the early promise at this stage and do not suffer similar issues of displacement to those experienced in previous applications of this approach.

Local Growth Zones
A Task and Finish Group established by Welsh Government look at the case for Local Growth Zones in rural areas has recently reported. The report identifies key development tools and policy levers including:

- High-speed broadband and WiFi
- Consistent mobile phone coverage and 3G / 4G services
- High quality road and rail infrastructure
- Development of commercial property which meets the needs of indigenous and incoming businesses
- A planning system which enables and facilitates appropriate economic growth and development
- Heritage-led regeneration initiatives focussed on properties in key historic town centres
- Training and skills provision which is better aligned with the needs of businesses
- Business rate relief targeted at specific areas
- Business support and funding which meets the needs of micro and small businesses
- Energy supply and infrastructure which is fit for purpose
- Effective use of EU funds to support business development, job creation, and growth
- Development of the tourism offer of the county

Focusing on the three key towns of Newtown, Llandrindod wells and Brecon the report identifies a specialisation approach in which Newtown becomes a service and business focused centre and Llandrindod builds on its current role as an event and conference destination. Brecon would further develop its role as an outdoor tourism centre and niche shopping destination.

The approach is identified as a rural alternative to Enterprise Zones but with similar mechanisms for addressing infrastruc-
tural, planning and business support needs. The report also suggests the appointment of town ‘champions in each location.

This approach reflects a county level, strategic analysis which identifies specialist roles for towns which could in some cases be in competition with each. It plays to existing strengths and identifies development opportunities in each case. Further development of the concept of LGZs offers considerable promise to identifying solutions for rural towns in Wales.
This chapter concludes our analysis of historical approaches to regeneration evident in the UK.
Conclusions

In this review paper we have outlined the gradual evolution of regeneration policy in the UK and identified some of the Special Purpose Vehicles which have emerged in support of regeneration policy. Following devolution in 1997 there has been considerable policy divergence but common themes exist in all the approaches examined. In particular combinations of policies which address the ‘people’ and ‘place’ agenda have characterised all the policies reviewed. A focus on area-based initiatives has also been a common feature in the periods considered and there is a general consensus that delivery at an identified spatial level is a core component of successful regeneration.

The range of conclusions we have identified in this analysis offer well evidenced analysis for consideration in the Welsh Government Review of Regeneration. We reinforce and add to these in subsequent Papers in this series of contributions to the Review process.

Bibliography

A full bibliography of all publications considered in our Review Papers is presented separately.